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Thaw in Uzbekistan. Reforms by President Mirziyoyev
Mariusz Marszewski
It has been almost two years since the death of the long-serving leader of Uzbekistan 
President Islam Karimov, and since Shavkat Mirziyoyev took up power (September 2016). 
The change has had spectacular results, including signs of liberalisation of the previous, ex-
tremely authoritarian system of rule, and economic reform, for instance with regard to stimu-
lating growth of small-scale business, and in fact activation of Uzbekistan on the international 
stage and normalisation of relations with neighbours. Meanwhile, certainly the most impor-
tant process under way in Uzbekistan is that of consolidation of power by the new president, 
and a key element of this is dismantling the might enjoyed to date by the National Security 
Service. The curbing of the position of the National Security Service, which has been success-
ful so far, entails internal restructuring of the state apparatus. The limited liberalisation and 
opening up to the world are mainly a result of this process. 
Mirziyoyev has created a new dynamic both internally and in the region. The effects will only 
become clear in the long term. The outcome of this new situation is uncertain; consolidation 
of the new president’s power and the ensuing reforms are accompanied by constantly recur-
ring crises which were frozen during Karimov’s rule. There are also external threats – a pos-
sibility of return to custodianship of Russia, a country which is fortifying its position, China’s 
increasing economic dominance, and growing strength of radicals among the Uzbek minority 
in northern Afghanistan. The emerging processes are therefore proceeding fast, and thus it is 
hard to determine whether the new Uzbekistan under President Mirziyoyev will prove to be 
a stable country in which the liberal reforms will continue.
Karimov’s legacy
Uzbekistan’s location (bordering all of the oth-
er former Soviet countries and Afghanistan), 
its population and economic potential, and its 
relatively well established identity and regional 
ambitions make it a crucial country in Central 
Asia. Over the 27 years of authoritarian rule 
under President Karimov, a repressive authori-
tarian system was built with highly developed 
state structures. Karimov’s survival and person-
al security, and internal stability, were a priority 
in Karimov’s political system. This dictated how 
the authorities acted, and led, when Karimov’s 
rule was in decline, to Uzbekistan becoming 
an isolated centre for conserving autocracy, 
oscillating between various global players, in 
which extensive and corrupt special services 
became the main instrument. Being a neigh-
bour to unstable countries that are experienc-
ing the effects of armed conflict and revolution 
(Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan) has only 
increased fear on the part of the political elite of 
possible liberalisation, making the country more 
authoritarian in nature and leading to brutal ac-
tion against political opposition and fear on the 
part of the authorities of modification of the old 
Soviet political and economic structures, which 
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were centred on control of society. These fears 
led to economic, social, and political problems 
being frozen and Uzbekistan’s self-isolation, 
making Uzbekistan less attractive on the inter-
national scene for global political partners, and 
generating conflicts with neighbours. 
As the political system evolved, the National 
Security Service (SNB1) became the most im-
portant state institution created to ensure se-
curity, survival and internal stability. It was the 
backbone of the entire state structure, and con-
trolled all aspects of political, social, and eco-
nomic life in Uzbekistan, and through this it also 
gained revenue. The main, unofficial source of 
financing for the SNB was exploitation of vari-
ous social groups in connection with inspections 
and repression, above all in the economic and 
also political and religious spheres. This entailed 
breaching democratic freedoms, human rights, 
and even Uzbekistan’s law and Constitution. 
The actions of the SNB blocked the development 
of independent political, social and religious life 
of any kind in Uzbekistan2. Gen. Rustam Inoya-
tov, head of the SNB, became one of the most 
important people in the country.
Even at the beginning of Karimov’s rule the 
secular and religious opposition was liquidat-
ed. At the same time, repression became more 
extreme as it was used to tighten the author-
ities’ control over society. The Uzbekistan ag-
1 An acronym was used that was taken from the Russian 
name of the service – Służba Nacyonalnoj Biezopasnosti. 
While the official Uzbek name is Milliy Xavfsizlik Xizmati 
(MXX).
2 As Karimov’s rule began to decline, rap music and teach-
ing of political science, for instance, were banned.
riculture- and industry-based economy found 
itself in a crisis. Even though the country has 
the best balance in terms of its own production 
in the natural resources region of Central Asia, 
it has been dominated by cotton monoculture 
destroying the water and ecological system, 
and putting strain on the social system. During 
Karimov’s rule, one of the main sources of the 
country’s income apart from cotton, due to ris-
ing unemployment, was revenue from Uzbek-
istan gastarbeiters, recruited mainly in Russia. 
Since 2014 this revenue has started to fall sig-
nificantly as well, contributing to the deterio-
rating economic climate in the country.
An element that has blocked Uzbekistan’s eco-
nomic development is the SNB’s multi-dimen-
sional control over financial flow and the pri-
vate sector, and the inefficiency of the public 
sector. Business activity was only possible if 
protection money was also paid to “custodians” 
in the special forces. Control over financial flow 
caused a black market to emerge for currency, 
from which the SNB profited. This was one of 
the major obstacles on the road to Uzbekistan’s 
economic development.
Mirziyoyev’s internal reforms: 
the economy and politics
When he took over from his predecessor, the 
new president had a choice between adapting 
to the existing system, in which he had func-
tioned as the long-serving premier, or moving 
on, and changing the system. Mirziyoyev chose 
the latter option. Under these new circumstanc-
es it was especially important to build relations 
with the SNB from scratch. Having chosen the 
road of change and confrontation, Mirziyoyev 
used this to free himself from the control of the 
services, trying to release the country’s poten-
tial and intensify its economic development at 
the same time by weakening the SNB’s control. 
He sought allies at home and abroad to ena-
ble safe succession and consolidation of power, 
and gave Uzbekistan an opportunity for eco-
nomic growth.
When Karimov’s rule was in decline, 
Uzbekistan become an isolated centre 
for conserving autocracy, oscillating be-
tween various global players, in which 
extensive and corrupt special services 
became the main instrument.
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Since 2016 there has been liberalisation of Uz-
bekistan’s political and economic system. This 
liberalisation has considerably improved quali-
ty of life of society. In February 2017 President 
Mirziyoyev approved, in a decree, a large-scale 
programme for political and economic reform 
for 2017–2021, and began to implement it. Five 
areas of priority for development of the country 
were specified – improving construction of the 
state and society (in the spirit of democratic re-
form and modernisation, it was announced that 
e-government would be introduced); ensuring 
the rule of law and judicial and legal reform; 
development and liberalisation of the econo-
my; development of the social sphere; ensuring 
security and harmony between various national 
groups and religious tolerance, and implemen-
tation of a sustainable and constructive foreign 
policy3 beneficial to all concerned. 
Five crucial sectors were also identified which 
are to be the motors behind economic growth 
up until 2021. These are the textile industry 
(changing the vector from production of cotton 
to processing cotton on the premises is a major 
goal) production of industrial and building ma-
terials, the agricultural sector (mainly fruit and 
vegetables), and the pharmaceutical and tour-
ism sectors. At the same time, the Uzbekistan 
authorities promised to improve the invest-
ment climate for foreign capital, and they reg-
ularly attempt to bring back Uzbekistan capital 
(in both small and medium-sized business, and 
oligarchs as well) from abroad. 
3 Ўзбекистон Республикаси Президентининг 2017 йил 
7 февралдаги ПФ-4947-сонли Фармонига 1-Илова 
2017–2021 йилларда Ўзбекистон Республикасини 
ривожлантиришнинг бешта устувор йўналиши 
бўйича Ҳаракатлар Стратегияси, http://www.lex.uz/
docs/3107036#3109143
In September 2017 the Uzbekistan public were 
allowed to purchase, for business and private 
purposes, unlimited amounts of foreign curren-
cies at the market rate. Cash dispensers were 
introduced in the country, and unrestricted 
trade in cash was permitted. This led the offi-
cial value of the UZS to almost double, but the 
universal corruption in the control of the SNB 
over business was also undermined. The system 
of repression was partly dismantled, in stages: 
the SNB’s powers were reduced, it was sys-
temically cleansed, and using falsification and 
torture4 to obtain evidence in court trials was 
prohibited and became punishable by a prison 
sentence. To date there has been no indication 
from human rights groups in Uzbekistan that 
this rule has been broken. The practice of indi-
vidual pardon was introduced for the first time 
in the country’s recent history at the president’s 
initiative. The persons released from prison dur-
ing Mirziyoyev’s rule included political prison-
ers detained for a long time (usually the long-
est in the CIS), who were notorious symbols of 
breach of human rights by the previous regime. 
The pardons introduced by Mirziyoyev began 
to be supported by religious grounds, for in-
stance when more than two hundred people 
were pardoned for the first time in Uzbekistan’s 
recent history to mark a Muslim holiday5.
This was connected with a revolutionary 
change made during Mirziyoyev’s rule, which 
was limited liberalisation in religious matters. 
4 Sud-tergov faoliyatida fuqarolarning huquq va erkin-
liklari kafolatlarini kuchaytirish bo’yicha chora-tadbirlar 
qabul qilinganligi munosabati bilan O’zbekiston Respub-
likasining ayrim qonun hujjatlariga o’zgartish va qo’shim-
chalar kiritish to’g’risida, 5.04.2018, http://xs.uz/uz/post/
sud-tergov-faoliyatida-fuqarolarning-huquq-va-erkin-
liklari-kafolatlarini-kuchajtirish-bojicha-chora-tadbir-
lar-qabul-qilinganligi-munosabati-bilan-ozbekiston-re-
spublikasining-ajrim-qonun-huzhzhatlariga-ozgar-
tish-va-qoshimchalar-kiritish-togrisida Laws were passed 
to stop the common practice of obtaining evidence 
for court cases by means of falsification and torture.
5 Мирзиёев впервые в связи со священным Рамазан 
хайитом помиловал 226 граждан, 13.06.2018, http://
muslim.uz/index.php/rus/novosti-2018/item/8876-mirzi-
joev-vpervye-v-svyazi-so-svyashchennym-ramazan-kha-
jitom-pomiloval-226-grazhdan
Since 2016 there has been liberalisation 
of Uzbekistan’s political and economic 
system.
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When the previous president was in power, 
repression in this area was the main tool for 
the SNB’s control over society. When liberali-
sation began, dialogue was also entered into 
with the political opposition and Muslim clergy 
abroad. Lists of suspects of religious extrem-
ism, which SNB officers regularly used to take 
bribes from people who would otherwise face 
arrest, were abolished. Symbols of the Muslim 
religion were allowed to be displayed in public. 
This would not have been possible during the 
times of the fervent secularism of the previous 
president. At the same time, Mirziyoyev began 
to exploit religion in domestic politics in instru-
mental fashion, following the example given 
by neighbours, among other things by express-
ing views in public which were similar to those 
of the influential religious authority figures in 
questions of condemnation of easing of moral 
values, indulgent lifestyle, nepotism, etc. Ele-
ments of freedom of speech and dialogue with 
the authorities in the hitherto strictly controlled 
electronic sphere were allowed. The measures 
described above were warmly welcomed by the 
Uzbek public and also made the new president 
of Uzbekistan very popular in neighbouring 
countries6.
Dealing with the SNB
The measures taken by Mirziyoyev which are de-
scribed above were opposed by the SNB, which 
had penetrated all aspects of life in the country. 
When consolidating his power and trying to re-
vive the economy, the president found himself 
in conflict with a powerful and independent 
tool of repression and control in his country. 
As a result of the clash between the presi-
dent and the SNB there was a massive cleans-
6 For more details see for example interview with an op-
positionist from Tajikistan, presenting the president 
of Uzbekistan in a positive light in neigbouring Tajik 
society, М. Кабири, Мы предложим правящей элите 
Таджикистана идею общенационального договора, 
«Независимая газета», 3.06.2018, http://www.ng.ru/
cis/2018-06-03/100_kabiri.html
ing, reshuffle, and replacement of personnel. 
The main areas of conflict between the president 
and the disloyal apparatus became not only the 
SNB but also other structures penetrated by SNB 
officials, which include the public prosecutor’s 
office and the foreign and finance ministries. 
The official reasons for the mass arrests, reshuf-
fles and dismissals were allegations of treason, 
corruption, and dealing in narcotics. After 22 
years in office, the omnipotent General Inoya-
tov, in charge of supervising breeding of fish7, 
was dismissed. The general’s influential replace-
ments were sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Following criticism of actions of the Ministry 
of Finance, more than five hundred employees8 
were dismissed from the ministry. Almost all 
of the heads of the peripheral government au-
thorities were dismissed (along with the heads 
of the peripheral militia, public prosecutors’ of-
fices and tax offices) as were dozens of heads 
of district authorities. They were replaced with 
personnel loyal to Mirziyoyev. The scale of the 
reshuffle is demonstrated by this year’s show 
trial of Prosecutor-General Rashid Kadyrov9.
7 Before that time another influential rival of the presi-
dent, Rustam Azimov, was removed from public life 
in the country in a similar way. Rustam Azimov was 
a long-serving finance minister and deputy prime minis-
ter. He was also transferred to an agricultural position.
8 Расмий: Молия вазирлиги тизимидан 500 дан ортиқ 
ходим ишдан бўшатилган, 12.12.2017, http://uza.uz/oz/
politics/rasmiy-moliya-vazirligi-tizimidan-500-dan-or-
ti-khodim-ishdan-27-12-2017
9 Former KGB and SNB officer and long-serving prosecu-
tor general, and above all a millionaire with assets in 
Uzbekistan, CIS and the EU. He amassed this level of 
wealth due to a corrupt system of successfully closing 
court cases and granting amnesty to those convicted.
The SNB’s powers were reduced, it was 
systemically cleansed, and using falsifi-
cation and torture to obtain evidence in 
court trials was prohibited and became 
punishable by a prison sentence.
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The trial led to a string of arrests, with 25 influ-
ential state officials10 arrested in a single day. 
In subsequent cleansing waves, conducted level 
by level, SNB officers who had been involved 
in arresting their predecessors and whose 
posts they had inherited11 were also arrested. 
The SNB’s powers were reduced so that it no 
longer had jurisdiction for instance over interior 
troops, and it was deprived of some of its spe-
cial powers, which were returned to the Inte-
rior Ministry. To deal with the SNB definitively, 
former personnel loyal to the new president in 
power ministries that rivalled the SNB and were 
previously subordinate to the SNB were used 
(mainly from the public prosecutor’s office and 
the interior ministry). Among others, General 
Zakir Almatov12, the interior minister known for 
strong-arm rule from 1991–2006 and a politi-
cal rival to the leadership of the SNB, returned 
from political oblivion to be appointed advisor 
at the interior ministry. He is seen by the public 
however as responsible for brutally suppress-
ing mass public protests in 2005 in Andijon13. 
The president has been forced to perform re-
shuffles within the existing structures, stopping 
at people who are tried and tested from outside 
the SNB (but often with similar reputations) due 
to the scarce reserves of personnel. Thus Mir-
ziyoyev’s reforms are in fact reorganisation of 
the power apparatus on the basis of personnel 
decisions. The president is reaching for persons 
who proved themselves during his premiership 
10 С. Ислом, Rashitjon Qodirov ishi doirasida bir kunning 
o‘zida yana 25 kishi ushlandi, 22.03.2018, https://www.
ozodlik.org/a/29115672.html
11 А. Искандар, Мирзиëев “Ит ўғри” деб атаган МХХ 
раиси ўринбосари, генерал Тошпўлатов ҳибсга 
олинди, 14.03.2018, https://www.ozodlik.org/a/ozbeki-
ston-mxx-toshpolatov/29098774.html
12 Zokirjon Almatov IIVga qaytdi. Vazirlik obro‘sini ko‘tar-
ishga va’da berdi, 27.02.2018, https://www.ozodlik.
org/a/29066197.html
13 Government sources say that during the massacre 187 
people were killed, while according to independent 
sources there were many times more civilians killed in 
the brutal pacification, for more details see “Bullets 
Were Falling Like Rain”, The Andijan Massacre, May 13, 
2005, Human Rights Watch Report, June 2005, Vol. 17, 
No. 5(D).
and is also making use of his family connections 
in the highly populous eastern part of the coun-
try (Fergana Valley), from where residents can 
now join government. During Karimov’s rule, 
residents of the region were treated as untrust-
worthy representatives of a place of refuge for 
the religious opposition. These strategies of 
the president are clearly far from the image of 
democratic reformer excellently developed for 
the sake of the West.
Mirziyoyev’s final act to deal with the rival pow-
er structure was to destroy the notorious Tash-
kent Prison (the important visual symbol of vio-
lation of human rights by the SNB14), move the 
SNB headquarters from the centre to the out-
skirts of the capital, and change the name of 
the reformed structure to the State Security Ser-
vice. It soon become known colloquially by the 
Russian version of the acronym, SGB (Sluzhba 
Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti) in allusion to 
the KGB15. The new SGB is not intended to per-
form the same role as the interior ministry and 
army by having its own extensively developed 
military structures. The dismissed SNB officers 
are however employed, following checks, in 
the militia and army, probably to present them 
becoming a destructive force. The scale of the 
informal political struggle and the ensuing dan-
gers is also demonstrated by information that 
14 Tashkent Prison (Toshkent qamoqxonasi, commonly 
known as Toshturma) was an archaic, overpopulated 
SNB detention centre notorious for torture and poor 
conditions Detention Centre 1. The foundations were 
laid in the times of the tsars. In Soviet and modern 
Uzbekistan it was a symbol of the Gulag.
15 The official Uzbek name of the new special service 
is Davlat Xavfsizlik Xizmati (DXX).
The clash between the president and the 
SNB led to mass cleansing, reshuffles, and 
replacement of personnel, for which the 
formal grounds were allegations of trea-
son, corruption, and trading in narcotics.
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 278 6
judges (who at one point were the profession-
al group at greatest risk) have been ordered 
to possess a weapon or armed security16.
Mirziyoyev becoming open: 
the new Uzbekistan and its neighbours 
For the president, a key element in the building 
of the new Uzbekistan was settling the ques-
tion of relations with neighbours and becom-
ing politically open to global superpowers, and 
the most important goal was stimulating the 
economy to bring about macroeconomic and 
microeconomic growth. Mirziyoyev took a se-
ries of measures aimed at reforming interna-
tional policy, attempting also to cleanse this 
area of state activity of the stigma of the SNB 
and other elements of Karimov’s legacy. One of 
the allegations made by Uzbek oppositionists in 
exile was that the diplomatic service was over-
whelmingly infiltrated by SNB officials. In prac-
tice they performed intelligence and counterin-
telligence activities for the regime rather than 
their official functions. The president reacted 
to criticism regarding this situation, declaring 
among other things that SNB17 officials would 
be dismissed from posts in embassies.
At the same time, these structures preserved 
Karimov’s geopolitical testament. His foreign 
policy was essentially centred on counteracting 
the spread of instability from neighbours, the 
Uzbek diaspora (Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan 
were considered the most dangerous as they 
function in the most liberal and democratic 
political system in Central Asia) and global su-
perpowers. The isolationist concept codified in 
2012 of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy was found-
ed on a ban on placement within Uzbekistan of 
foreign military bases, not joining military and 
16 Судьяларга қурол берилиб, оиласига қуролли 
соқчилар ажратилади, xabar.uz, 19.03.2018, https://
www.xabar.uz/huquq/sudyalarga-qurol-berilib-oilasi-
ga-qurolli-soqchilar-ajratiladi
17 Из узбекских посольств уберут сотрудников СНБ, 
Vesti.uz, 14.01.2018, 
https://vesti.uz/iz-uzbekskih-posolstv-uberut-sotrud-
nikov-snb/
political blocs and peacekeeping operations 
abroad, and rejecting mediation from foreign 
superpowers in conflicts in the Central Asia re-
gion18. 
Mirziyoyev began the political reform in this 
area by becoming open to the world and nor-
malising relations with neighbours against 
whom his predecessor had pursued an aggres-
sive policy. This primarily concerned the smaller 
neighbours (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) inhab-
ited by a large, commercially active Uzbek mi-
nority which is in various phases of ethnic con-
flicts with the nominal national groups in those 
countries. The painstaking process of demarca-
tion of borders and dividing water resources, 
opening new border crossings, restoring airline 
connections and lifting visa restrictions was re-
sumed, applying a strategy in which its own in-
terests were secured by working together with 
its neighbours. 
The most vivacious relationship at strategic 
partnership level was forged with its most pow-
erful regional rival, Kazakhstan. Working with 
Astana, political and economic integration pro-
jects were launched in the Central Asia region. 
As part of the regional integration, including 
its unstable southern neighbour, in March 2018 
Uzbekistan organised a conference in Tashkent, 
attended among others by high-ranking US 
and Russian officials, on the future of Afghani-
stan. A country outside of the region (but close 
18 M. Fumagalli, When Security Trumps Identity: Uzbeki-
stan’s Foreign Policy under Islam Karimov, in: Construct-
ing the Uzbek State. Narratives of Post-Soviet Years, ed. 
by M. Laruelle, Lanham-Boulder-New York-London 2017, 
pp. 3-21.
The scale of the informal political struggle 
and the ensuing dangers is also demon-
strated by information that judges (who at 
one point were the professional group at 
greatest risk) have been ordered to pos-
sess a weapon or armed security.
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to Uzbekistan in terms of culture and language) 
with which an attempt was made to forge 
similarly far-reaching relations to those with 
Kazakhstan, was Turkey. 
The new Uzbekistan’s global relations – 
Russia and other partners
Mirziyoyev also had to regulate its relations 
with foreign players, above all Russia. At the 
moment Russia is the most powerful external 
political actor in Uzbekistan. During the pro-
cess of taking over Karimov’s political system 
Mirziyoyev tried at least to assure favourable 
neutrality on the part of Russia. For Moscow 
however the change of power in Tashkent pre-
sented an opportunity to increase its influence 
in Uzbekistan and was a test (observed care-
fully by other countries) of its true power in 
the region. Mirziyoyev’s rule therefore opened 
up areas for Russian activity. Until that point 
Tashkent had performed a series of pro-Mos-
cow gestures in issues relating to policy relat-
ing to historical narrative (mainly concerning 
positive presentation of their common Soviet 
past in public; a sentimental view of the Soviet 
past had been consistently condemned when 
Karimov was in power). Measures were taken 
aimed at allowing Russian capital in the hands 
of Uzbeks living in Russia into the internal mar-
ket. Uzbek-born oligarch Alisher Usmanov, who 
has links with the Kremlin, has positioned him-
self as the key negotiator between the Uzbeki-
stan ruling elite and foreign investors (not only 
Russian). Binding agreements have been signed 
regarding construction by Russian investors of 
nuclear power plants in Uzbekistan. Military co-
operation has been revived, for instance for the 
first time in ten years soldiers in the Uzbekistan 
army will study and attend courses at military 
academies in Russia. In the near future Russia 
can be expected to push for a possible return 
of Uzbekistan to the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO) and for it to join the Eura-
sian Economic Union (EEU).
The factors described above also determine 
relations within the Tashkent-Moscow-Beijing 
triangle. Until now, in Uzbekistan, these have 
been formed (as in the entire Central Asia re-
gion) based on a joint-rule model – econom-
ic influence of China, with Russian retaining 
influence in international security and foreign 
policy. China’s influence in Uzbekistan has been 
increasing steadily since 2011, but is still not as 
strong as in smaller countries in the region and 
in Turkmenistan. China’s influence is also not as 
strong as Russian influence, and is mainly fo-
cused on the economy. Cooperation with Chi-
na is unavoidable for President Mirziyoyev due 
to the country’s economic problems and there 
being no alternative to Chinese investment and 
credit capital. On the other hand, stability in 
Uzbekistan is a priority for China. Due to its 
crucial location, problems of any kind in Uzbek-
istan could pose an indirect threat to the en-
tire region, and a direct threat to gas supplies 
from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan to China. 
They could also spread to the Uyghur minor-
ity in Xinjiang in western China (with cultural 
ties to Uzbeks). For the moment, schemes have 
been launched to increase economic coopera-
tion with China under the Belt and Road initi-
ative. This initiative entails among other things 
modernising the traditional communication 
routes from Tashkent through the Fergana Val-
ley to western China. This has already helped to 
revive trade in this area. 
Since taking up power, Mirziyoyev has tried to 
increase the political and economic involve-
ment of the Western countries in Uzbekistan. 
Mirziyoyev also had to regulate its rela-
tions with foreign players, above all Rus-
sia. During the process of taking over Ka-
rimov’s political system Mirziyoyev tried 
at least to assure favourable neutrality on 
the part of Russia.
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This is important because the post-Karimov 
Uzbekistan, which continues to pursue an in-
dependent and multi-vector policy, is located 
between China and Russia, and countries de-
pendent upon those two countries to varying 
degrees. The aim of announcing limited liber-
alisation of the country and of the excellent PR 
for the reforms is in fact to achieve an easing 
of dependence on powerful neighbours by 
forming good relations with the EU countries. 
In the West at the moment, the country most 
interested in cooperating with Uzbekistan is the 
United States. This is due, as in previous periods 
of friendly relations between Washington and 
Tashkent, to the US’ aim of building stable sup-
port facilities for military operations in neigh-
bouring Afghanistan. This element, being the 
main determinant of US policy, was engulfed by 
the flood of enthusiastic comments in the me-
dia describing President Mirziyoyev’s first offi-
cial visit on 15–17 May 2018 visit to Washington 
and his meeting with President Donald Trump 
and military and business representatives. 
In reality, relations with the US at any given 
time are no guarantee of the US investments 
that the country so badly needs, especially in 
the context of its recent history, in which US 
businessmen incurred losses and hurriedly with-
drew capital due to the previous president’s 
political backtracking. It is symptomatic in this 
context that following Mirziyoyev’s symbolical-
ly important visit to the US, Russian Defence 
Minister Sergey Shoygu visited Tashkent, which 
was a prelude to a visit by President Putin after 
his inauguration.
Conclusions and forecasts
As a result of liberal reforms following Kari-
mov’s death, in Uzbekistan the political and 
economic foundations of the all-powerful SNB 
were shaken up. The new president’s deter-
mined struggle with the oppressive structure 
for power indirectly led to an improvement in 
society’s standard of living, elements of a po-
litical thaw, economic revitalisation, normali-
sation of relations with neighbours, openness 
towards the West, release of political prisoners, 
and so on. Mirziyoyev’s consolidation of power 
is not however complete. Freeing oneself from 
the custodianship of the SNB and reforming 
and transforming its structure are only steps 
in this process. The country itself has come to 
a crucial point in its history. A thawing of the 
problems preserved by Karimov’s authoritarian 
political system could bring about the creation 
of a stable, more democratic Uzbekistan, but 
it is also highly likely that there will be social 
activism and destabilisation of an densely pop-
ulated country with a society of young people 
who do not see economic prospects in their 
home country. A country in which during the 
times of the repressive regime under the pre-
vious president stability of rule and internal 
peace were guaranteed now faces social and 
economic problems, and ecological problems 
on top of that as well.
In Uzbekistan internal regional divisions con-
tinue to exist. The history of construction of 
modern state structures is relatively short, 
which is typical for countries struggling with 
a post-colonial legacy19. There is a grave danger 
that conflicts in the ruling elite could lead to so-
cial upheaval. To add to this, Uzbekistan shares 
a border to the south with a country of deterio- 
19 A. Khalid, Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Rev-
olution in the Early USSR, Ithaca 2015.
In the West at the moment, the country 
most interested in cooperating with Uz-
bekistan is the United States. This is due 
to the US’ aim of building stable support 
facilities for military operations in neigh-
bouring Afghanistan. 
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rating stability, Afghanistan, and the influence 
of radical groups20 among the Uzbek minority 
in the northern part of that country is grow-
ing year by year. These could become a catalyst 
for the destruction of Uzbekistan in future if 
the negative prognoses turn out to be correct. 
Meanwhile, its crucial geopolitical location and 
20 See among other things: O. Ali, Non-Pashtun Taleban of 
the North (2): Case studies of Uzbek Taleban in Faryab 
and Sar-e Pul, 17.03.2017, https://www.afghanistan-an-
alysts.org/non-pashtun-taleban-of-the-north-2-case-
studies-of-uzbek-taleban-in-faryab-and-sar-e-pul/; 
B. Roggio, US military kills senior Islamic State com-
mander in Afghan north, 9.04.2018, https://www.long-
warjournal.org/archives/2018/04/us-military-kills-sen-
ior-islamic-state-commander-in-afghan-north.php
demographic potential mean that Uzbekistan’s 
internal problems could destabilise the whole 
Central Asia region. At stake in the Uzbekistan 
reforms is not only the future of a new presi-
dent as an independent political figure, but the 
stability and territorial integrity of the country, 
and more broadly the future of the entire region.
